showing an international agreement among the state agents against the nuclear programs of the Islamic Republic. Why different interests of the Security Council members did not prevent them from reaching "agreements" against Iran? On the other hand, the play off game of Iran did not achieve any suitable result. Here, the answer to the questions of "why(s)" needs answering "the how(s)". It seems that the ideological views of the Iranian agents with ethnicity significance possess a special place and it has been effective in achieving international agreements in each stages. These frequent agreements could be assimilated to some kind of "evolutionary loop" that occurs in the contexts of capitalism structure. This paper employs critical realism approach based on Roy Bhaskar viewpoint to find a way to carefully examine the role of ideological identities in the global capitalism structure-specifically in the nuclear case of Iran.
INTRODUCTION
Open minded use of Roy Bhaskar's critical realism is a way towards answering some questions on "how(s)" or in another word, in defining the mechanisms in underline social levels. Although in his idea, Bhaskar discusses three layers of epistemology cognition; that is, the real, practical and empirical levels; perhaps this insists on layering is not quite firm in this discussion because, the natural structures could not become compatible to the social structure completely; in fact, is better to consider two levels; one is the empirical level and the other is the real level (deep layer); in this term, the process of "democratic agonistic" could be assumed for the real level and "agreements " and "compulsions" in the empirical level. It seems there is a symmetry between changes in the actual level and the emergences in empirical level.
Compulsion is in fact "ultimate emergence" of social mechanisms as observed in form of sanction resolutions of the UN Security Council. "Rewards" (Incentives) are the very offers or intensifiers that are given to Iran. It should be said that the empirical level is the tangible manifestation of "sticks and carrots". The emphasis in this paper is on the actual level.
The Bhaskar and Ernesto Laclau's views as postMarxism discourse attitudes seem effective in such a case (Brown et al., 2002) . It seems that in passing from orthodox Marxism to post Marxism, the antagonist conflictions have been substituted by collaboration and the very subject has been considered as the basis of agreements against Iranian nuclear program.
In methodological terms, in discussing the "how(s)" the introduction reasoning is subject of concern; that is, E-mail:Mahmoodshahidi@yahoo.com moving from the recognized level of a phenomena into a deeper levels in order to define the phenomena and identifying the originating mechanisms; moving from observing several "agreements" whether in the IAEA or in the UN Security Council against Iran is being used towards a theory to determine the mechanisms that gave way to those agreements. The ideological functions of the Iranian agent are being focused in the contexts of the very structural mechanism since it intensifies the integrating mechanisms both among the state agents and with capitalism structure.
The interaction between state agents and international structure is not of "obedience" relationship-such as individualism or structuralism. Relations are not subject of a simple and linear expansion; it is rather subject of complicated mechanisms. The structure -agent relationship has rethinkable nature. The advantage of Bhaskar's critical realism lies in its exploration of causal mechanisms that combine with post-Marx discourse benefits and draws the interactions of structure and agents in full scope. (Bhaskar, 1998) . It could be said that the real world essentially exists however, its envisaging is of discourse nature (Brown et al., 2002, p124 ).
Bhaskar's idea believes structure and agent as essentially and intrinsically independent but interrelated. It is important to know structure "independent" as a "carrier" of ideas and mental grounds that remains even after changes in agents. The globalized structure of capitalism has been evaluated in the same way. In addition, as Bhaskar discusses the depth of epistemology in structure, the state agent could be also recognized as having a depth; that is, any agent has his own beliefs and compressed experiences that affect his reaction.
In this paper, revision is made on Bhaskar and Laclau; for they essentially emphasize on emancipation from capitalism exploitations like other critical approaches; however, the view taken in this paper evaluates capitalism in a relatively democratic context. The innovation of this research is that it employs a more expanded view and assumes the antagonists more adjusted and balanced. From this view, democracy gradually balances the conflicts in the limit between analogy and collaboration; thus, it gives a new concept of Bhaskar's emancipation-beyond the logic of class and clashes of classes.
Mechanism and forces of globalized capitalism and its interaction with the agents
Affected by globalization, capitalism is pictured in two economic and social structures: the economic structure is based on the transnational interdependency and the social structure is based on trans-conflicts (nonconfliction grounds). Therefore, the deterministic laws and class societies of the orthodox Marxism are put aside. In turn, the role of post-Marxism becomes more significant in this context. This interdependence and nonShahidi 25 conflicting interactions reconstructs the causal powers of capitalism in stability, confidence building and "flexibility". The global capitalism mechanisms could be divided into two causal and discursive types: The causal mechanisms are resulted from global and integrated production that goes beyond the "center-peripheral" international work division theory -in viewpoints of thinkers such as Walterstein. "The new production mode of capitalism" consists a new international division of work, dehierarchism and restrictions in the sovereignty of states. The discourse mechanisms shape the state agents' beliefs and mental pictures and establish inter-subjective relations. Essentially, confidence building in capitalism has discoursing nature. Identity buildings take place in this atmosphere and a common knowledge and perception is founded.
These identity findings occur in the capitalism structure ground. The state agents try to achieve a stabilized identity in the international functions in the process of bargaining. "The threshold of identity finding" finds its meaning in this context. Frequently, Europeans reach to this threshold of identity finding earlier than China and Russia; a fact that could be observed in the three sanction resolutions passed against Iran.
Essentially, a "time cycle"(like a loop) has already passed for issuing any resolution during which, the bargaining and arguments of the state agents achieved results in a democratic process ,and after relative disobedience of Iran, another cycle was developed ,a new process of "agonistic democracy" was formed and new resolutions were passed. The general process seems as evolutionary proceeds in terms of collaborations among state agents; therefore, one might speak of "evolutionary loops" in the process of nuclear program case of Iran. In fact, each time cycle-from the agonistic democracy among power agents to the development of forceful and intensifying resolutions-is a test to check the reinforcement of identity findings and identity buildings.
In addition, more integrity is developing gradually; for example, the early passing of resolution 1747 unanimously, compared to the previous resolutions; that show facilitation of the process of convincing and agreement. Resolution 1803; too, was passed shortly after the missile test of Islamic Republic of Iran. The phrase "reasonable grounds" in resolution 1803, while being unclear, still seems threatening because it implicitly showed that there has been convincing reasons to doubt the nuclear program of Iran (Fayazmanesh, 2008) .
In fact, deepening the evolutionary loop process during few years of continuity of nuclear program case of Iran has been reinforced tangibly in the three resolutions: 1737, 1747 and 1803. In addition, the increasing cooperation between Europe and the U.S. in the threshold of passing resolution 1803 seemed signs of requirements in the developing order and security for the capitalism structure that would not tolerate interpretations of lower than collaboration, and mandated a more constructive cooperation. This process could be seen as a part of changes in the international map of the world in the chaotic post-cold war atmosphere that gave news of confident building group identity. (Osborne and Kriese, 2008) .
Nonetheless, this loop process could be extended to the time prior to passing UN Security Council's sanction resolutions too: Essentially, passing resolution September 2005 that put the qualification of dealing with nuclear case of Iran into the hand of UN Security Council showed USA and Europe in a more integrated relationship than before. The tone of the resolution was more serious than before and the Agency's demands from Iran were higher. In addition, referring the Iran's case to the UN. Security Council, although with no special mechanism-as a solution in case of Tehran's disobedience of the resolution-was also included in the pact (Alexander and Hoening, 2007) . Since March 2005, United States has been supporting the European countries that run negotiations with Iran more rigorously and active and suggested to offer some privileges (Incentives) to Iran in form of economic encouragement. (Fayazmanesh, 2008) .
Any delay in passing the resolutions was both an opportunity to "identity finding" constructions and a chance to regulate and improve encouragements. By final passing of each resolution, the "compulsory" stage has appeared and manifested. Iran could use the gaps among state agents if they have not reached the threshold. It seems that as time passes, the new loops show fewer gaps.
In fact, the bargaining process among state agents in form of "agonistic democratic" reveals the mechanisms of actual levels. The bargaining of state agents is affected by globalization in terms of non-hierarchical interdependency; the transpolar characteristics of global economy cause the united rejection of the anti-fundamental factors such as the ideological approaches of Iran. On the other hand, the hegemony agent; that is the Untied States, is also called to participate and collaborate. Of course, at the same time, changes in the state agents were effective in the intensity and weaknesses of integrities; for example, the intensification of west integrity by the administration of Angela Mercker in Germany, Sarcozy in France and ultimately, Obama in the Untied States. The traditional European intention is based on dividing the penetration benefits and cooperation in the framework of classic diplomacy, as manifested in the Solana's idea of "a partnership for action". In the first years of Bush administration, the "democratic flag" was emphasized, being a type of warn to the Europeans in giving priority to "global democracy" particularly in the middle-east. (Solana, Le Figaro le 21 fevrier, 2005) Gradually, United States accepted the Europe's position in the region as an active and equal actor. In general, the power agents are pushed towards "cooperation based on co-level" affected by the global structure of capitalism.
Although, Europe has not been able to attract the Iranian agent to the process of convincing, by structural confirmation, it has attracted America towards balanced and associated interactions and increase pressures to Iran. In fact, the "neo-conservatism linear evolution" idea was revised and more expanded frames were considered for cooperation. Of course, the soft European attitude gradually became more realistic.
As far as it considers the effects of "ethnic World", China, Russia and Europe share a common concern on religious fundamentalism; therefore, cooperation of those countries does not necessary caused by their convincing experiences in political, economic and military grounds and is rather caused by the post-cold war expanding unsettlements. On the other hand, the basis of transAtlantic cooperation is democratic and implies defending peace in a vaster concept. The pillar of the cooperation of West with Russia and China-as non-western groupsaims at preventing "serious threats" and establishing security in a continuous frame.
From the structural viewpoint, as the ideological load of actions intensifies, capitalism shows more productivity in dealing with Iran and accelerating collaboration among the power agents. This structural productivity impacts on power agents and do not give much chance to Iran to step in agnoism interactions in the deep social layers.
Characteristics and impacts of Ideological identity

Classic nationalism
Essentially, since nationalism is not a totalitarian ideology, it could give light and tone to various spectrums of ideological systems and in this case, nationalism classic as an important category in the Iranian agents' ideology consists of some elements, some of them are examined as follows:
The security-based attitude or security dilemma is one of those elements. The important question here is "security for whom?". This view gives priority to security of the government than the national security. Historically, in terms of providing security, the relationship between government and the society has always been a dual and challenging relation. It seems that the basis of government's security is somehow different from people's security. Populism is the second category of classic nationalism: essentially, nationalism classic considers vast deprivations in form of social justice with populist perspective. As far as Iran may concern, this populism has taken religious view and uses" Shia"(a branch of islam) to serve it. In this case, not much attention is paid to the requirements of genuine nationalism (Miller and Vincent, 1990) . Religious populism is automatically a rhetoric behavior for public mobilization based on emotional tools with no consideration to the requirements of genuine nationalism.
On the other hand, the western concepts of modern nation-state such as independence and nationalism meaning guaranty of individual freedom in eastern societies (third world countries) leads to "guarantying freedom of groups" and have taken distance from the concept of national interests.
Ethnicity in this situation finds meaning as a significant concept. Ethnic group is essentially a "sub identity" that forms around religious, cultural, lingual and traditional knowledge; while nation consists of "all characteristics of ethnic". In addition, it is expressed in the framework of certain geography and/or a political centrality. Most naturally, the national interests are defined in this framework. (Farsoun and Mashayekhi, 1993) .
In international level, in the light of special implication of communication, ethnicity comes in conflict with the governmental existence and leaves turbulence manifesttations. In such atmosphere, contacts with sub-groups find increasing importance and subsequently, national interests are doomed (or are pushed to margin). Therefore, nationalism classic could be evaluated in such an atmosphere-that is, a mixture of security dilemma, religious populism and ethnic interests. (Farsoun and Mashayekhi, 1993) .
It seems that declaring nuclear program as a symbol of national pride and its relative penetration in people could be discussed in this ground as far that the very conservative attitude became a barrier in compromise of Mohamamd Khatami's reformist government.
Revolutionary internationalism
In theoretical point of view, there are two active actors in the ideological system. In Islamic Republic of Iran, a state actor is Constitutional sector and there is an ethnicmovement interactor as revolutionary internationalism. The acts of the two seem different: for example, government should be subject of the international conventions and the UN charter but in the revolutionary state-affected by sub-nationality-they could be breached.
The second interactor, the revolutionary internationalism is mixed with concepts such as Jihad (fighting with the enemies of Islam) or global government and supporting world oppressed, that could be compared with concepts such as The Center of the Workers, Communism's Revolution in World and Mother Party to continue global revolution against capitalism (Abrahamian, 1993) . In this section, both revolutionary approach and religious traces are seen in policy making.
The above-mentioned concepts, as identity parameters, take the foreign policy beyond territorial and political geography. Therefore, it challenges the international system based on state sovereignty system and naturally, it tries to affect international dimension through sub-groupism. Thus, here; too, the concept of ethnicity becomes significant.
Ethnicities
Sub-groupism vs. state-centrism
An important part of foreign policy in Iran is established on the basis of Shia identity and revolutionary ideas and its objective manifestation is seen in its efforts to expand regional penetration against Israil. Iran has no problem in working with Sunni groups-such Hammas-if possible although this attitude has increased the conflicts and complexity of foreign policy in Iran (Farsoun and Mashayekhi, 1993) . This is a product of interfere of religious identity with the national identity in Iran.
By this notion, Islamic Republic of Iran could be divided into two parts in terms of type and degree of foreign relations. The first part that provides the ideological sources of the system and has special, but at the same time expanded nature. That is, it establishes the main pillar of normative exchanges in framework of Islamic Internationalism. The important point is that this part of ethnic ideology is more or less free from state-based world and its interaction with world-ethnic is under the presumption of it being a part of multi-center world. The world ethnic does not tolerate the Westphalia type of state-and subsequently, the post-Westphalia ones: Hammas in Gaza, Sadr group in Iraq and Taliban are examples.
Although, in jurisprudential implication, religion in Islam is different from Islam in Arab and African worlds; the religious internationalism has forced it to confront America and Israil; therefore, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not follow a completely specific paradigm and consequently, it is realized in the framework of some general principles.
Ethnicity as the source of conservatism
The fact is that one of the important categories in determining the relationship between Islamic Revolution and the outside world is the very ethnicity as a part of nationalism classic. The constitutional part of Iranian system although, it considers communication with statecentered world-is affected by ethnicity and is not successful in establishing strategic communication with the influential world powers.
The ideological ethnicity, in dealing with the real challenges of outside world, inevitably inclines towards conservatism. This conservatism could be seen in the basic shifts of the system in critical and vital points (Pollack, 2004) .
Absence of International creativity and brevity-freedom in act-and rhetoric attitude are among the requirements of ideological conservatism. The real world facts in some cases led to secularization of foreign policy in Iran as it could be seen in nuclear crisis in some extents.
In fact, simultaneous activity of the two practices of compromise (mainly because of conservatism) and detente, both create some unstabilities in the foreign policy of Iran that covers its goals, strategies and abilities in mist. The declared policy of Iran concerning the possibility of compromise on uranium enrichment-the possibility of accepting suspension of uranium enrichment -and centrifuges rotation without gas injection are signs of conservatism requirements at the same time as ideological trends of the agent. In fact, one may speak of ideological capitulation of the revolutionary system of Iran that appeared in practices such as efforts to come into some kind of strategic unity with Russia (Sheikh, 2002) .
In fact, it could be claimed that this practice has been successful in some cases; attendance of Nicolas Burns, the political Deputy of U.S. Foreign Ministry in Geneva summit along 1+5 was considered as a big step taken by the United States in direct talk with Iran. This participation was a success for the European's convincing diplomacy and conveyed a clear message for Iran on the possibility of compromise. (Figaro 17/7/2008) .The truth is the nuclear crisis forced Iranian leaders to adjust their conduct and in another world, to secular it (Boroujerdi, 1992) .
National interests in two communications contexts: states-based and ethnic-based
An important point is that despite the fact that both during reformists and conservatives, there have been communications with state-based world; the type and weight was different. Because, according to the reformists' intention, those communications were beyond a mere conservative source and were a process to improve the international status of Islamic Republic and subsequently, it had strategic aspect. This is the very reason in practice it faced strong challenges inside the body of the government. (Mafinezan and Aria, 2007) . Reformists tried to present a modern interpretation of religion and revolution to match the current relations in the world; an issue which was more compatible with the European diplomacy too (Mafinezan and Aria, 2007) .
For example, "The red line" of Hassan Ruhani, the Secretariat of National Security High Council during "reformists" was "stopping" enrichment rather than its "suspension". (although, he himself is one of the moderate conservatives). Accepting suspension via Tehran Decree was justified with the same reasoning (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty: 2006/4/5) while in ahamdi Nejad's administration, red line covers any interruption.
During the sovereignty of conservatism administration, communication with the state-centric world seemed conservative source in some extent. The dilemma of national interests in the Islamic Republic of Iran originates from this very point; however, the reformist government relatively showed a clearer concept of national interests.
According to what stated above, ethnicity not only is a result of lowering interaction among unities, but also is affected by the weight and type of Communication. Ethnicity prevents formation of public values; special values, in turn, lead to conflict with dominant process of the international relations and consequently, reproduce the issue of security as the priority in foreign policy of Iran. Therefore, the role of ideological intention manifests a loop of insecurity (Pollack, 2004) . The movement attitudes are symbols of localization and constitutional attitudes are symbols of globalization. (Semati, 2008) .
Degree of ideological identities in nuclear case of Iran
The ideological doze of Islamic Republic of Iran has not been the same during its sovereignty. Either in the first decade of revolution or during its economic and political reforms, there has always been some degree of pluralism and political interaction in running the country (Ehteshami, 1995) . The reform era coincided with the administration of Hashemi Rafsanjani, as the second republic and Khatami's administration as the third republic. However, the 8 th course of parliament with conservatives' majority, that could be also called the forth republic and during fifth republic; that is, Ahmadi Nejad's administration, this variety of decision -making was pushed to margin in favor of radicalization and brought forth the "pure ideology" move in security context. (Ehteshami and Sweiri, 2008) .
As the neo-conservatism was instituted-although even during reformists; too, it had manifested in the parliament in framework of fourth republic-more radical mottos were declare in nuclear program field. The Iranian nuclear plan issue could be assessed in the core of the very structural changes in power; change in the Iran's side taking and retrieving from October agreements could be explained by changes in power inside Iran; for, the reformists were gradually pushed to margin and in turn, the conservatives took over decision making positions. The superpowers of Europe (EU3) were pushed to margin and at the same time, the UN Security council took harsher views.
Despite pushing reformists aside, the ideological dose of the agent did not remain constant and two trends have been appeared in conservatism depth: a viewpoint implies the revolutionary power that considers counteraction with neighbors, particularly the Sunni Arab leaders, destruction of Israel and expansion of the religious government beyond borders and there is another view that considers nuclear technology merely to safeguard national security and territorial immunity. It is in connection with the second viewpoint that normalization of relationship with west and accepting nuclear obligations takes place. Larijani, the president of High Council of National Security, as a religious conservative, showed more preparation for practice compared to the ideological behavior of the rightist revolutionary and radical movement leaders. (Sustar, 2008; House of commons, 2008) . After meeting with Javier Solana, the coordinator of EU Foreign Policy-before passing resolution 1803-expressed views on Iran's achieving enrichment knowledge and ineffectiveness of suspension issue (Cologne Radio, 2007) , showing the low importance of" suspension" and refraining from making the nuclear program an international affair.
It seems that the main problem is not nuclear technology itself; but, it is Iran's conduct as a revolutionary government with intentions that conflicts the interests of neighbor countries and west. Based on nationalism classic and revolutionary internationalism, Iran will continue its nuclear expanding policy; a policy that in viewpoint of radical wing(hard-liners) has increased its internal prestige and has brought more voices for it in international relations (Chubin 2006) . At present, the "nuclear dreams of Iran" is connected to its internal motifs and implications.
The viewpoint of governmental conservatives-the ideological agents-could be analyzed with respect to their revolutionary histories, perceptions or mechanismsArmageddonic. Attitudes in the international attitude of new generation of Iranian leaders-coincided with Ahmadi Nejad's election in August 2005-a basic change took place. In their view, globalization does not necessary manifest in having relationship with west and it is possible to have relationship with other international actors. In general, the new generation of Iranian leaders has become described as more passive than before in terms of international interactions (Takeyeh, 2006) . The so called "inclination to east" policy of this generation could be viewed in this atmosphere.
It seems that, after Larijani-Solana talks, the subject had taken distance from "convincing for agreement" against Iran; however, Larijani-Solana's negotiations met its fall in Fall 2006! (Tierksy and Jones, 2007) . These actions-reactions with many ups and downs finally led to passing resolution 1737 in December 2006; while at the same time-December-the Holocaust world conference was held in Iran! Then, Ahamdi Nejad's statements in January concerning no retrieve at all and passing time in the time when there was supposed to be negotiations with the Europeans, seemed in contradiction with some of the policies of Islamic Republic of Iran; For example, it could be compared with more or less peaceful tones of Ali Larijani against mutual suspension-suspension coinciding lifting sanctions. (BBC 2007/1/30) . In the same way, offering few more face-saving plans such as nuclear fuel bank in form of an international consortium as well as suspension vers suspension (time out) could not put nuclear issue in a smooth ground (Jahanpour, 2007) .
Final resignation of Larijani was a symbol of frequent Shahidi 29 stresses between the two thoughts. The competitor's viewpoint discussed nuclear issue in some extent higher than populistic concepts. A part of inefficiencies and ambiguities in nuclear policy of Iran should be attributed to the differences in views on political future of the Republic; for, it has two ways ahead of it, one is return to the revolutionary republic and the other is pragmatism reinforcement. The first path implies more stressful atmosphere in dealing with west and the second path, contrariwise, puts compromise on priority.
In any event, as reformsits were held back, the equations changed in some extent and more ideoloigic voices were heard form the Iranian party. The new generation of power in Iran is a mixture of militarism and theocracy and persues two main goals: The first is political substitution of a traditional generation and the second goal-which is an important step towards first goal-is the very step to step control of the system for the purpose of transferring power to an "Islamic government". Therefore, different post-revolutionary side taking in Iran does not seem to come to an end and the clergymen-as the traditionalistsare standing against the new generation. (Mohammadi, 2003) .
It seems that the prolonged matter of referring the case to the Security Council implied the weakness of West's diplomacy in the mentality of new agents. The statements of the Iranian president in the Conference on a World Without Sionism (Zionism) in November and the new resolution of IAEA, called Iran as an identity incompatible with others. Statements such as "our nuclear train has no brake" was translated into a symbol of militarism in the western mentality. (BBC, 2007) .
The foundation of foreign policy of Iran seemed to be efforts to lead Islamic world; however, since it did not have sufficient tools to realize that leadership, it directed its efforts in the scope of ethnic identity-with emphasize on radicalism. The impact of such approaches on foreign policy could not be denied (Miller and Wincent, 1990) . The main range of the crisis was landed on the intention of the Islamic Republic and no observer could give a precise view on it (Bellaigue, 2007) .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
It seems that collaboration of state agents (5+1) could be searched in a ground of structural opportunities of capitalism system; a system that in turn is affected by the interactions of a multi-centered world, the state-world and ethnic world. Ethnicity could endanger sustainability in capitalism structure. Confronting with" ethnicity world" and digesting it in one of the two worlds (governmental and multi-centered), is the same overall attitude towards peace and democracy that calls for participation and cooperation of governmental agents for its insurance. What is happening now is the domination of semi-Kant views that in one hand is a result of global capitalism and on the other hand, is the product of "democratic" intentions of USA and Europe (Kagan, 2004) .
Today, even the global capitalism is facing the risks and unsettlement caused by ethnicity. To exit from this situation, the only solution is to grasp collective identities. Such identities would lower distrust in "The Age of Nonpolarity". In such atmosphere, the ideological trends in Iran imply a type of black or white thought that could not become compatible with identify building in form of "agonistic democracy". Of course, such thought was also found in neo-conservatives too (Chan, 2005) . In turn, the leaders of superior European countries and EU kept the doors of nuclear negotiations open for Iran even in "unsuitable conditions" although, so far it has gained no final results.
The global capitalism has changed the traditional dynamism between Europe and America. Europe by adopting legal attitude considered democracy as an endogenous act and followed the hardware attitude of neo-conservatives with concerns. However, at present, America takes Europeans more seriously as international actors and earn their mutual cooperation in order to pull them out of unsettlement. For this reason, the interestsbased intentions are moving to the margin and integrated socialism appears more clearly.
In general, in the process of nuclear case of Iran, the ideological aspects of the agents were mostly bound the process of international convincing. The Iranian agent shows signs of its preparation to step into political games; for, it always considered negotiation as tools for improving relationship and did no definite act to lift its obligations officially; despite it, the ideological presence in ethnicity meaning has limited the possibility of interaction.
It seems that the group 5+1 -especially the Europeanshave mostly adopted management of changes to shift the palce and role creation of Iran. The Europeans see the possibility of changes in ideological agent not in a fully radical form, but mostly in the direction of new balances of power and subsequently, new identity building.
With respect to the ethnic priorities, it seems that the biggest thing the ideological agent in Iran asked was "assuring its security". On this basis, the American guarantees were seen necessary along with the European diplomacy. By increasing integrities and the supports of Security Council, West will be inevitably dragged to some manifestations of interactions or confrontation with Iran. As far as it is related to the interaction, it seems that Europeans have not engaged themselves with the presidency administration directly and have more tried to follow nuclear issue from diplomatic channels while Untied States traditionally rejects the whole structure of Islamic Republic.
It seems that the Europeans' view was more compatible with the structural realities because there have been two intentions in Iran; the first is based on buying time and ideological approach as seen in the president administration's pole, and the second is compromise and agreement as seen in the diplomatic wing. The first wing has a nationalism classic view and revolutionary internationalism that imply the win or loss play.
